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Abstract In two studies, we examined the influence of
behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and need for closure
(NFC) on information processing in decision making. We
expected that BIS would regulate behavior in a decisional
context and that this relationship would be mediated by
epistemic motivation expressed by NFC. In addition,
drawing on contradictory findings in the literature on
anxiety, NFC, and information processing, we investigated
the moderating role of decision rules. The results supported
our predictions. BIS was strongly and positively related to
NFC, and through NFC it was related to decision-making
style. Moreover, decision task characteristics moderated
the relationship between NFC and decision making. When
a task did not offer a confident decision rule, high NFC
participants prolonged the information search more than
low NFC individuals. However, when a reliable strategy
was suggested, high NFC participants behaved in line with
it. These results are discussed within an uncertainty man-
agement framework.
Keywords Behavioral inhibition system  Need for
cognitive closure  Decision making
Introduction
Decision making involves a considerable amount of
uncertainty. When faced with a choice, a person may not
know all of the available options, may be unable to
recognize the quality of each option, or may select an in-
effective decision making strategy, all of which create
stressful and psychologically demanding conditions. One
variable that is responsible for the regulation of behavior in
such situations is the behavioral inhibition system (BIS;
Gray and McNaughton 2003). Another variable worth
studying in this context is a person’s need for closure,
which expresses a motivated tendency to form clear and
unambiguous judgments (NFC, Webster and Kruglanski
1994). In this paper, we examined whether individual dif-
ferences in self-reported BIS, due to its relevance for self-
regulation in uncertain and ambiguous situations, predict
decision-making style and whether this effect is mediated
by NFC. Moreover, as previous studies on the effects of
anxiety and NFC on judgment and decision making offer
contradictory findings, we investigated the moderating role
of task characteristics on information processing during
decision making.
Individual differences in sensitivity to uncertainty
and decision making
Past research has confirmed that feelings of uncertainty are
related to increased physiological stress markers (Greco
and Roger 2003) and cardiovascular patterns that are
characteristic of response to threat (Mendes et al. 2007).
One variable that is relevant to the regulation of behavior
in uncertain situations is the behavioral inhibition system
(BIS), which controls reactions to conflicting, ambiguous
or novel stimuli and is responsible for the anxiety experi-
enced in such situations (Gray and McNaughton 2003).
The activity of BIS inhibits ongoing behavior and increases
arousal and attention, which helps to determine which of
incompatible or novel goals will dominate the course of
action (McNaughton and Corr 2004).
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Neuropsychological evidence has directly linked the
experience of uncertainty with BIS. For example, BIS is
related to the activity of the anterior cingulate cortex
(Amodio et al. 2008), which serves to detect potential
threats and expectation violations (Aston-Jones and Cohen
2005). Another study demonstrated an association between
BIS and right-posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortical ac-
tivity, which is sensitive to uncertainty and ambiguity
(Shackman et al. 2009). A study by Herry et al. (2007)
showed that unpredictability alone was sufficient to induce
neural activity in the amygdala, which is related to BIS, in
both mice and humans. On a behavioral level, unpre-
dictability elicited anxious behaviors such as avoidance
and enhanced attention toward negative stimuli (Herry
et al. 2007). Other studies have demonstrated a relationship
between individual differences in anxiety and reactions to
uncertainty (Hirsh and Inzlicht 2008; Knyazev et al. 2005).
These results show that uncertainty is an aversive and
stressful experience, which is positively related to anxiety
controlled by BIS. As decision making involves evaluation
of conflicting, risky or novel choices and is inherently as-
sociated with uncertainty, BIS may play a role in this
process.
However, it is not clear which information processing
style is best suited to reduce the uncertainty and anxiety
experienced during decision making. Several studies have
demonstrated that under conditions of uncertainty, stress
and anxiety, individuals decrease information processing,
form quick judgments and make simple decisions (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974). For example, individuals with high
trait anxiety gathered less information before making a
decision and made faster decisions than individuals with
low trait anxiety (Bensi and Giusberti 2007). Similarly, in
an experimentally induced stress condition, subjects had a
stronger tendency to end the task more quickly, engage in
non-systematic scanning of information and made deci-
sions without considering all available options compared
with subjects in no stress condition (Keinan 1987). Par-
ticipants under stress were also more selective when per-
forming multi-attribute choice tasks in comparison to less
aroused participants (Kossowska and Wichary 2006). Re-
sults of other studies have shown that coping with uncer-
tainty consumes self-regulatory resources, and when
uncertainty is induced people choose easier and less de-
manding options than when they feel certain (Alquist 2010;
Milkman 2012). However, other studies have shown that
uncertainty and related anxiety are associated with com-
plex judgments and systematic decision making. For ex-
ample, studies on causal uncertainty have demonstrated
that people who chronically feel uncertain process infor-
mation more systematically than people who chronically
feel certain (Weary et al. 2001; Weary and Jacobson 1997).
Tiedens and Linton (2001) demonstrated that participants
were less likely to use heuristic processing when induced to
feel emotions associated with uncertainty than when in-
duced to feel emotions associated with certainty. In some
cases, uncertainty can also cause people to postpone de-
cisions until the uncertainty is resolved, which shows that
quick judgment is not a preferred option when feeling
uncertain (Shafir 1994). Drawing on these contradictory
findings, in the present paper, we investigated whether
decision task characteristics may act as possible mod-
erators of decision making style when BIS is activated.
Motivation to reduce uncertainty and decision making
Previously, we proposed that BIS is a system that is re-
sponsible for sensitivity to uncertainty that should affect
decision making. Moreover, we believe that motivation to
exit uncertain and ambiguous situations by forming quick
and clear-cut judgments, i.e., NFC (Webster and
Kruglanski 1994), may mediate the effect of BIS on de-
cision making. Individuals with high NFC are intolerant of
confusion and uncertainty and therefore are inclined to
make rapid decisions (Kruglanski 2004). On the other
hand, low NFC individuals are motivated to analyze si-
tuations in a systematic manner, to consider alternative
options, and to make complex decisions (Kruglanski 2004).
It could be expected that high NFC helps to shorten anxiety
experienced in uncertain situations and therefore should be
more pronounced when BIS is situationally activated or
among people chronically high in BIS. Although this is a
convincing possibility, there has been little research re-
ported on the link between NFC and BIS. Results of one
clinical study support the positive link between anxiety and
NFC (Colbert et al. 2006). In addition, Roets and van Hiel
(2008) found that, when unable to reach closure in a de-
cision task, high NFC individuals expressed physiological
stress such as increased heart rate, higher systolic blood
pressure and increased electro-skin conductance. Results of
one recent study (Corr et al. 2013) demonstrated a strong
and positive link between BIS and NFC. However, this
study was concentrated on social attitudes and did not
examine behavioral correlates of both variables. Thus, the
purpose of our paper is to examine the relationship between
BIS and NFC, and to verify if NFC mediates the effect of
BIS on decision making style.
Although most previous research has demonstrated that
NFC is related to a simplified cognitive process involved in
decision making, a limited information search, and a
preference for clear and unambiguous judgment, some
findings contradict this conclusion. Among the studies that
demonstrate the former, Choi et al. (2008) showed that,
before making a consumer choice, high NFC individuals
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considered less information and preferred a more simplistic
and non-compensatory mode of decision making than low
NFC subjects. Similar results were obtained by Webster
et al. (1996), who demonstrated that participants with
elevated NFC demanded less information before forming a
judgment. Moreover, these individuals were more suscep-
tible to the primacy effect than subjects with low NFC.
Stronger reliance on early and accessible information under
heightened NFC was also shown in studies by Kruglanski
and Freund (1983). They found that both the primacy effect
and anchoring were stronger under time pressure and de-
creased when participants expected that their judgments
would be evaluated. Individuals with high NFC are also
more confident in their decisions (Mayseless and
Kruglanski 1987), prefer more familiar options, and ex-
perience stronger regret after choosing an unfamiliar option
than individuals with low NFC (Mannetti et al. 2007).
However, there is also evidence that under specific
conditions, high NFC individuals search for more infor-
mation and postpone their decision to a larger extent than
low NFC individuals. For example, Vermeir et al. (2002)
asked participants to choose between brands of unfamiliar
products to eliminate reliance on prior knowledge. In this
situation, high NFC individuals searched for more infor-
mation about products than low NFC individuals. More-
over, high NFC participants sought significantly more
information before their opinion was crystallized than after
that point, while this pattern was not found for low NFC
participants. Similar findings were obtained by Houghton
and Grewal (2000), who found that high NFC resulted in a
less extensive information search only when the products
involved in the decision were important to the participants;
therefore, participants presumably had well-formed and
accessible opinions. Otherwise, no differences were found
between high and low NFC individuals. In another study,
when the choice was easy and therefore the subjects’
confidence in their initial hypothesis was relatively high,
subjects high in NFC tended to search for less information
than subjects low in NFC (Kruglanski et al. 1991). How-
ever, when the choice was difficult and their initial confi-
dence was low, subjects high in NFC searched for more
information than subjects low in NFC. Similarly, Kos-
sowska and Bar-Tal (2013) demonstrated that NFC was
strongly associated with quick and simple decision-making
only among individuals who expected to be able to satisfy
their epistemic need, i.e., had high ability to achieve clo-
sure. For participants low in ability to achieve closure,
NFC was associated with systematic processing, which was
manifested by more complex and time-consuming decision
making.
These studies suggest that without a satisfactory basis
for closure, whether resulting from familiarity with a
subject or sufficiently strong confidence in an initial guess,
NFC is not in fact related to a limited information search.
Only when high NFC individuals had some prior knowl-
edge on which to base their judgment did they make a
decision earlier than low NFC individuals. However,
without a basis for a clear-cut judgment, high NFC indi-
viduals prolonged the searching phase to a greater extent
than low NFC individuals. This finding would further
suggest that the need for cognitive closure is not satisfied
by any rapid and impulsive answer; rather, a particular type
of answer is sought by high NFC individuals. Specifically,
high NFC individuals seek the answer or decision that al-
lows them to reduce uncertainty in a legitimate and satis-
factory way. Otherwise, they should prolong their
information search.
Overview
In two studies, we tested a model of the relationship
between self-reported BIS, NFC and decision making
behavior. Because BIS is activated in uncertain situations,
we expected that it should be related to the decision
making process. We also predicted that more sensitive
BIS should be associated with high NFC. Moreover, we
hypothesized that the relationship between BIS and de-
cision making style would be mediated by high NFC. In
addition, drawing on the conflicting results from previous
research, we explored the moderating role of task char-
acteristics in the relationship between decision making
and both BIS and NFC. We examined these relationships
using an abstract and unfamiliar decision task, and we
either did not inform participants about the best decision
strategy or we directly manipulated the basis for closure
by specifying the decision strategy. We expected that
without sufficient confidence in a rule, participants high in
NFC would engage in a more extensive information
search before making a decision than participants low in
NFC (Study 1). In contrast, when a specific decision rule
was offered, we expected that an anchoring effect would
be found such that participants high in NFC would behave
more in line with the suggested rule than participants low
in NFC (Study 2).
Study 1
The aim of the Study 1 was to explore the relationship
between self-reported BIS, NFC and behavior in an ab-
stract and unfamiliar decision making task that offered no
prior information about the best strategy by which to make
decisions. We used the Information Sampling Task (Clark
et al. 2006), in which participants gathered information and
made a decision about the proportion of colored boxes on a
board of 25 boxes. Because the task allowed participants to
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reduce uncertainty by gathering more information without
any costs and in a short amount of time, we expected that in
such conditions BIS and NFC would be related to a longer
decision time and a more extensive information search.
Secondly, we hypothesized that BIS would be related to a
higher level of NFC and that NFC would mediate the ef-
fects of BIS on the decision-making process.
Method
Participants
The study was conducted on-line. Participants were 115
students from a large Polish university recruited via a
student mailing list (97 women, 17 men, 1 person did not
report gender, Mage = 21.42, SD = 3.89). In exchange for
their participation, each participant could win one of four
tickets in a lottery (each worth approximately $15).
Materials and procedure
The study was programmed in Inquisit software (Inquisit
2013). Participants completed BIS and NFC scales and
then performed the Information Sampling Task (Clark et al.
2006).
Behavioral inhibition system BIS was measured with
Carver and White’s 20-item BIS/BAS questionnaire (Carver
and White 1994; Polish translation: Mu¨ller and Wytykowska
2005). In subsequent analyses, we only used the BIS sub-
scale, which consists of seven items (a = 0.72). A sample
item is ‘‘I worry about making mistakes.’’ Participants
indicated how much they agreed with each item on a scale
from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). The items
were reversed such that higher scores indicated higher BIS.
Need for cognitive closure NFC was measured with the 27
items of Webster and Kruglanski’s scale (1994; Polish
translation: Kossowska 2003). The scale includes four sub-
scales: Preference for Order, Preference for Predictability,
Discomfort with Ambiguity, and Closed-mindedness. The
fifth subscale, Decisiveness, was replaced with six items
developed by Roets and van Hiel (2007) because the original
subscale has been recognized as measuring ability to achieve
cognitive closure instead of motivation. A sample item is ‘‘I
don’t like situations that are uncertain.’’ Participants indi-
cated their responses on a scale from 1 (completely disagree)
to 6 (completely agree). The Closed-mindedness subscale
was excluded due to its low reliability, and the overall index
was calculated using only four other subscales (a = 0.85).
Information sampling task (IST) To measure the decision
making process, we used a task developed by Clark et al.
(2006). Participants were presented with a 5 9 5 matrix of
25 grey boxes and two colored panels at the foot of the
screen (e.g., yellow and blue). When a participant clicked
on a grey box, it revealed one of two colors and remained
open for the entire trial. The task was to decide which of
the two colors prevailed on the board. Participants could
open as many boxes as they wanted before making their
decision. They won points for each correct decision and
lost points for an incorrect decision. Once they decided
which color was in the majority, participants clicked the
panel with this color. At that point, the remaining boxes
were uncovered, and participants received feedback about
points earned or lost.
The task consisted of two rounds presented in a coun-
terbalanced order with ten trials in each round. In the Fixed
Wins (FW) round, participants could win 100 points if they
made a correct decision, irrespective of the number of
opened boxes, and they lost 100 points if they were wrong.
In the Decreasing Wins (DW) round, there were costs of
opening boxes such that the maximum amount to win (250
points) decreased by ten points for every box opened.
Again, after an incorrect decision, participants lost 100
points, regardless of the number of boxes opened. A test
trial took place before each round. Although we expected
that effects would occur in the FW round when there were
no costs of gathering information, we included the DW
condition to explore the effects of NFC under conditions of
trade-off between uncertainty and loss. Decision behavior
was measured by the average number of boxes opened, the
decision time, and the number of correct judgments made
in each condition. The total points won indicated overall
task performance. In the present article, we will focus on
information search as indicated by the number of boxes
opened and decision time. Decision time was measured
from the moment participants were first presented with the
matrix to the moment they made a decision. It was log
transformed.
Results
To verify whether BIS and NFC were related to informa-
tion search and decision time we analyzed the pattern of
correlations between those variables. In the second step we
tested the mediation model for each of the dependent
variables. Both analyses were conducted separately for the
FW condition and the DW condition. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics and correlations between variables.
Number of opened boxes
In both FW and DW rounds bivariate correlations between
BIS and the number of opened boxes and NFC and the
number of opened boxes were not significant. To test the
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simultaneous effects of BIS and NFC on information
search, we used the PROCESS program (Hayes 2013). We
tested mediation models separately for the FW and DW
rounds. We controlled for the order of rounds, but it was
not significant; thus, this variable was dropped from the
analysis. In the analysis for the FW round we excluded one
case that had a much stronger influence on the model pa-
rameters than other cases (as indicated by Cook’s distance,
studentized residuals, and DFFIT).1 In line with our hy-
pothesis, BIS had a significant and positive effect on NFC
(b = 0.50, SE = 0.08, b = 0.51, p\ 0.001). NFC had a
positive effect on the number of opened boxes (b = 2.70,
SE = 1.15, b = 0.25, p = 0.02). Neither the direct effect
of BIS on the number of opened boxes (b = -1.04,
SE = 1.12, b = -0.10, p = 0.357), nor the total effect
(b = 0.31, SE = 0.98, b = 0.03, p = 0.757) were sig-
nificant. The entire model was marginally significant [F(2,
111) = 2.83, p = 0.063, R2 = 0.05]. More importantly,
the indirect effect of BIS on the number of opened boxes
estimated with 20,000 bootstrapped samples was sig-
nificant [b = 1.34, 95 % CI (0.23, 2.83)], which indicates
that BIS was related to information search through its
impact on NFC. The mediation model is presented in
Fig. 1. There were no significant effects of NFC and BIS
on the number of opened boxes in the DW round.
Decision time
Correlations between BIS and decision time were not sig-
nificant (in the FW round: r = 0.07, p = 0.451; in the DW
round: r = 0.09, p = 0.363) but correlations between NFC
and decision time were significant in both rounds (FW:
r = 0.20, p = 0.029; DW: r = 0.19, p = 0.045).
In the mediational analysis for the FW condition BIS
had a significant and positive effect on NFC (b = 0.48,
SE = 0.08, b = 0.48, p\ 0.001). NFC had a positive ef-
fect on decision time (b = 0.09, SE = 0.04, b = 0.22,
p = 0.038). Neither the direct effect of BIS on decision
time (b = -0.02, SE = 0.04, b = -0.04, p = 0.733) nor
the total effect (b = 0.03, SE = 0.04, b = 0.07,
p = 0.451) were significant. The entire model was
marginally significant [F(2, 112) = 2.48, p = 0.088,
R2 = 0.04]. Although the confidence intervals for the
indirect effect estimated with 20,000 bootstrapped samples
included zero [b = 0.04, 95 % CI (-0.001, 0.10)], the











Decision time (FW) 0.07 0.20*
Decision time (DW) 0.09 0.19* 0.58***
Opened boxes (FW) 0.05b 0.16b 0.62*** 0.31***
Opened boxes (DW) 0.05 0.14 0.40*** 0.74*** 0.46***
Mean 3.12 3.79 3.97 3.89 16.69 9.60
SD 0.53 0.52 0.22 0.26 5.64 4.69
Range 1.86–4.00 2.37–5.00 3.50–4.52 3.34–4.68 3.80–25.00 0–20.80
Possible range 1–4 1–6 – – 0–25 0–25
N = 115
* p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.001
a FW refers to the Fixed Wins condition and DW refers to the Decreasing Wins condition
b Due to the exclusion of an outlier in the model of relationships between BIS, NFC, and the number of opened boxes (n = 114) the correlations
for this model are different: between BIS and NFC (r = 0.51, p\ 0.001), NFC and Opened boxes (FW) (r = 0.20, p = 0.03), BIS and Opened
boxes (FW) (r = 0.03, p = 0.757)
Fig. 1 Mediation model of the relationship between BIS, NFC, and
number of opened boxes (Fixed Wins condition) in Study 1
(*p\ 0.05, ***p\ 0.001)
1 The regression diagnostics statistics were much higher for this case
than for other cases (Cook’s distance = 0.19, Studentized resi-
dual = -2.74, Standardized DFFIT = -0.79).
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Sobel test for this indirect effect was marginally significant
(b = 0.04, SE = 0.02, p = 0.052). The mediation model
for the DW round was not significant (the Sobel test
b = 0.04, SE = 0.03, p = 0.089).
Discussion
The results obtained in the first study demonstrated atypical
effects of NFC on the decision-making process. Despite the
fact that in previous studies NFC was usually related to
simplified information processing (Choi et al. 2008;
Kruglanski and Freund 1983), in our study in the round
without costs of information (FW) high NFC individuals
engaged in an information search to a greater extent than low
NFC individuals. We think that high NFC participants
opened more boxes and spent more time on decision making,
because with relatively little effort and no costs they could
greatly reduce uncertainty regarding the correct decision.
Even opening all boxes on a matrix, which in this task al-
lowed participants to achieve absolute certainty, did not take
much longer than a more limited information search.
We believe that this effect is due to the specificity of the
decision task that offered a single rule—opening more
boxes—on which high NFC individuals could base their
decision. This effect is in line with previous studies that
showed higher cognitive engagement among high NFC
individuals when there was no prior knowledge that would
reduce their uncertainty (Vermeir et al. 2002). However,
although this is an intuitively appealing explanation, it
needs to be tested directly. This was the goal of the Study
2, in which we manipulated the presence/absence of a
decision rule. Moreover, despite the fact that direct effects
of NFC on information search and decision time were
significant, the models were only marginally significant.
Thus, the aim of the Study 2 was to replicate the basic
effect of NFC on decision making.
The effect of NFC on the information search was sig-
nificant in the FW round where no costs were associated
with information search, but it was weaker and not sig-
nificant in the DW round when information was costly.
This difference might suggest that high NFC individuals
engage in a more extensive information search when no
additional trade-off is necessitated between reducing
uncertainty and increasing gains. However, such conclu-
sions must be treated with some caution, as the observed
effects in both conditions were rather weak. Thus, we de-
cided to keep both conditions in Study 2 in order to
replicate the effects and further investigate the possible
difference between them.
In line with our expectations, we observed a strong and
positive relationship between BIS and NFC. This finding
suggests that NFC may be one of the motivational
mechanisms by which individuals who are sensitive to
uncertainty regulate their interactions with a stressful envi-
ronment. NFC as a motivation to form clear-cut and unam-
biguous judgments may decrease anxiety experienced in
such situations by individuals with heightened BIS activity.
We found a significant indirect effect of BIS through
NFC on the information search. However, with regard to
decision time, this effect was not significant. We believe
that those results offer partial support to the hypothesis of
the effects of uncertainty on decision making in terms of
heightened NFC. In Study 2, we aimed to replicate those
effects and directly test their boundary conditions. Contrary
to our hypotheses, the total effect of BIS on our dependent
variables was not significant. It could result from the fact
that the indirect effect of BIS on decision making process
was positive but the direct effect of BIS, though in-
significant, was in the opposite direction.
Study 2
The goals of Study 2 were to replicate the results of Study 1
and to verify whether the relationship between BIS, NFC,
and information search would change depending on the
presence or absence of an explicit decision rule. To achieve
these goals, we manipulated the information given to par-
ticipants about the appropriate strategy to use in the deci-
sion-making task. We expected that participants high in
BIS and NFC would behave more in line with the sug-
gested decision rule than participants low in BIS and NFC
because information that decreases the level of uncertainty
is more important for the former individuals. Specifically,
we hypothesized that in comparison to individuals low in
BIS and NFC those high in BIS and NFC would prolong
their searching process and would inspect more informa-
tion when offered a rule that encouraged them to search for
more information. However, when told that the best rule is
to limit the information search, they would decrease the
amount of acquired information and shorten their decision
time. In the control condition, when no information re-
garding the optimal way of solving the task was presented
to participants, we aimed to replicate the results obtained in
Study 1. Moreover, we expected that the effect of BIS on
decision time and information search would be mediated
by NFC. We further explored the effect of rounds differing
in costs incurred for information search (Fixed Wins vs.
Decreasing Wins) to parallel Study 1.
Method
Participants
The study was conducted on-line. Two hundred twenty-
three participants were recruited via invitation placed on a
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popular free ads web portal (185 women, 38 men,
Mage = 23.30, SD = 5.59). In exchange for their par-
ticipation, each participant could win one of eight tickets in
a lottery (each worth approximately $15).
Materials and procedure
The study was programmed in Inquisit software (Inquisit
2013). BIS (a = 0.73) and NFC (a = 0.89) were measured
with the same scales as in Study 1. The only change was
introduced in the IST task, in which we manipulated the
decision rule in both rounds (FW and DW).
Manipulation of the decision rule We manipulated the
content of the decision rule by presenting participants with
information that ostensibly described how other people
perform in this task. In the high anchor condition before
conducting the FW round, participants read: ‘‘People who
do this task on average open 24 boxes. Their accuracy level
is 90 %.’’ Before the DW round, the number ‘‘24’’ was
substituted with ‘‘15’’ to adjust it to the fact that people in
the DW round opened fewer boxes on average than in the
FW round. In the low anchor condition, the information
stated: ‘‘People who do this task on average open eight
boxes. Their accuracy level is 90 %.’’ Before the DW
condition, ‘‘eight’’ was substituted with ‘‘five.’’ Informa-
tion about accuracy was introduced to strengthen the per-
suasiveness of the information. In the control condition no
information about average number of boxes opened was
offered. We dummy-coded the manipulation variable with
a control condition as a reference group, which produced
two variables: Low Anchor Condition and High Anchor
Condition.
Manipulation check To verify whether participants re-
membered the information about the rule throughout the
task, we asked them at the end to state how many boxes
other participants opened during this task.
Results
Manipulation check
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of con-
dition on the manipulation check items [In the FW round:
F(2, 220) = 103.11, p\ 0.001, g2 = 0.49; in the DW
round: F(2, 220) = 83.80, p\ 0.001, g2 = 0.43]. Par-
ticipants in the low anchor condition remembered that
other people opened fewer boxes (FW: M = 7.95,
SD = 3.83; DW: M = 5.47, SD = 2.49) than participants
in high anchor condition (FW: M = 20.99, SD = 5.72;
DW: M = 14.84, SD = 6.08). In the control condition,
participants thought that others opened 13.58 boxes
(SD = 6.73) in the FW round and 7.69 (SD = 4.55) in the
DW round.
Number of boxes opened
In the control condition NFC was positively related to the
number of opened boxes in the FW round, but the effect in
the DW round was not significant. In the high anchor
condition the effect was in the similar direction but was not
significant and in the low anchor condition this relationship
was negative and not significant. BIS was positively related
to number of opened boxes only in the control condition for
the FW round. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and
correlations between variables separately for the three
conditions.
We used the PROCESS program to test the interactional
effect of NFC and the manipulation, and the indirect effect
of BIS on the information search through NFC (Model 16;
Hayes 2013). In the FW round the model was significant
[F(7, 215) = 6.96, p\ 0.001, R2 = 0.18]. In line with our
expectations, we found that BIS had a positive effect on
NFC (b = 0.58, SE = 0.08, b = 0.43, p\ 0.001). We also
found a significant interaction between NFC and the ex-
perimental manipulation (NFC 9 Low Anchor Condition:
b = -4.16, SE = 1.48, b = -0.42, p = 0.005;
NFC 9 High Anchor Condition: b = -0.38, SE = 1.55,
b = -0.04, p = 0.80; for both interactions, R2-
change = 0.035, F(2, 215) = 4.60, p = 0.011). The effect
of NFC on the number of opened boxes was positive and
significant in the control condition (b = 2.30, SE = 1.06,
b = 0.23, p = 0.031). The effect was positive but not sig-
nificant in the high anchor condition (b = 1.91, SE = 1.22,
b = 0.19, p = 0.119) and was negative but not significant
in the low anchor condition (b = -1.86, SE = 1.10, b =
-0.19, p = 0.094). These results are presented in Fig. 2.
The direct effect of BIS on the number of opened boxes
was not significant (b = 0.76, SE = 0.93, b = 0.06,
p = 0.419). However, the indirect effect estimated with
20,000 bootstrapped samples was significant in the control
condition [b = 1.33; 95 % CI (0.23, 2.73)]. This effect was
positive but not significant in the high anchor condition
[b = 1.11, 95 % CI (-0.36, 2.77)], and it was negative but
not significant in the low anchor condition [b = -1.07,
95 % CI (-2.50, 0.15)]. We also performed a test of
moderated mediation (Hayes 2013). The difference in the
indirect effects between the control condition and the high
anchor condition was not significant [95 % CI (-2.09,
1.50)], but it was significant between the control condition
and the low anchor condition [95 % CI (-4.34, -0.74)].
The effect of order of rounds was significant (b =
-3.30, SE = 0.82, b = -0.50, p\ 0.001), which means
that participants opened more boxes in the FW round when
this round was first. There were no significant effects of
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NFC and BIS on number of opened boxes in the DW
condition.
Decision time
In the high anchor and control conditions NFC was
positively related to decision time in the FW round, but
those effects in the DW round were not significant. In the
low anchor condition the relationship between NFC and
decision time (FW and DW) was negative and not sig-
nificant. However, the correlations between BIS and deci-
sion time in both rounds were not significant.
The mediation model was significant in the FW round
[F(7, 215) = 7.10, p\ 0.001, R2 = 0.19]. BIS had a
positive effect on NFC (b = 0.58, SE = 0.08, b = 0.43,
p\ 0.001). We found a significant interaction between
Table 2 Intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations (Study 2)
BIS NFC Decision time (FWa) Decision time (DWa) Opened boxes (FW) Opened boxes (DW)
High Anchor (n = 79)
BIS
NFC 0.43***
Decision time (FW) -0.02 0.27*
Decision time (DW) -0.02 0.22 0.75***
Opened boxes (FW) 0.01 0.19 0.63*** 0.31*
Opened boxes (DW) -0.08 0.15 0.45*** 0.63*** 0.54***
Mean 3.08 4.02 3.93 3.86 14.81 10.03
SD 0.48 0.59 0.29 0.30 6.00 4.51
No Anchor (n = 77)
BIS
NFC 0.49***
Decision time (FW) 0.14 0.33***
Decision time (DW) -0.01 0.12 0.67***
Opened boxes (FW) 0.26* 0.27* 0.76*** 0.44***
Opened boxes (DW) 0.17 0.08 0.40*** 0.69*** 0.49***
Mean 3.10 3.81 3.84 3.75 14.28 8.70
SD 0.52 0.70 0.28 0.29 6.57 4.33
Low Anchor (n = 78)
BIS
NFC 0.39***
Decision time (FW) -0.10 -0.17
Decision time (DW) 0.03 -0.12 0.80***
Opened boxes (FW) -0.06 -0.22 0.66*** 0.39***
Opened boxes (DW) 0.11 0.00 0.52*** 0.60*** 0.59***
Mean 3.09 3.85 3.76 3.69 10.81 6.88
SD 0.46 0.67 0.31 0.28 6.54 4.41
* p\ 0.05; *** p\ 0.001
a FW refers to the Fixed Wins condition and DW refers to the Decreasing Wins condition
Fig. 2 Number of opened boxes (Fixed Wins condition) as a
function of NFC and rule manipulation (Study 2)
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NFC and the experimental manipulation (NFC 9 Low
Anchor Condition b = -0.19, SE = 0.07, b = -0.43,
p = 0.004; NFC 9 High Anchor Condition b = 0.01,
SE = 0.07, b = 0.02, p = 0.902; for both interactions, R2-
change = 0.04, F(2, 215) = 5.41, p = 0.005). Further
analyses showed that the effect of NFC on decision time (in
FW) was positive and significant in the control condition
(b = 0.15, SE = 0.05, b = 0.32, p = 0.003) and in the
high anchor condition (b = 0.16, SE = 0.06, b = 0.33,
p = 0.005), but it was negative and not significant in the
low anchor condition (b = -0.05, SE = 0.05, b = -0.10,
p = 0.357). The visualization of this interaction is pre-
sented in Fig. 3.
Although the direct effect of BIS on decision time (FW)
was not significant (b = -0.04, SE = 0.04, b = -0.06,
p = 0.382), the indirect effect estimated with 20,000
bootstrapped samples was significant in the control condi-
tion [b = 0.08; 95 % CI (0.04, 0.15)] and in the high anchor
condition [b = 0.09, 95 % CI (0.03, 0.18)]; however, this
effect was not significant in the low anchor condition
[b = -0.03, 95 % CI (-0.09, 0.03)]. The difference in the
indirect effects between the control condition and the high
anchor condition was not significant [95 % CI (-0.08,
0.09)], but it was significant between the control condition
and the low anchor condition [95 % CI (-0.20, -0.04)].
Finally, the effect of order of rounds was significant
(b = -0.15, SE = 0.04, b = -0.50, p\ 0.001), which
means that decision time in the FW round was shorter
when this round was second. There were no effects of NFC
and BIS on decision time in the DW condition.
Discussion
In the control condition of Study 2, when no anchor was
offered to participants, we obtained a similar pattern of
results as in Study 1. In the FW round in this condition high
NFC subjects gathered more information and spent more
time making a decision than low NFC individuals. In the
high anchor condition, we obtained the same pattern of
results and this group was not significantly different from
the control group. However, when an available decision
rule suggested that a limited information search was the
strategy successfully employed by other participants (low
anchor condition), the effects of NFC with regard to de-
cision time and number of opened boxes were not sig-
nificant. These results are consistent with our expectations
that high NFC individuals would behave in line with ac-
cessible and reliable rules. Our experimental manipulation
induced differences among high NFC individuals but in-
dividuals low in NFC were not affected by it. It is an
interesting result, because in the high anchor condition the
suggested style of processing—longer decision making
process and extended information search—was opposite to
the one usually associated with high NFC. We think that
this anchoring effect occurred because such rules decrease
uncertainty, which is important for high NFC individuals.
This result corroborates past research showing how psy-
chological states similar to NFC (e.g., cognitive load, low
need for cognition) resulted in stronger judgmental an-
choring and insufficient adjustment (Epley and Gilovich
2006).
In Study 2, we replicated the strong and positive rela-
tionship between NFC and BIS found in Study 1. More
importantly, in the FW round we also replicated the indi-
rect effect of BIS on decision making in the control group.
This pattern of results offers support for our initial as-
sumption that the effects of sensitivity to uncertainty on
decision making result from avoidance of uncertainty and a
stronger motivation to reach closure among highly uncer-
tain individuals. Significant moderation of this indirect
effect by situational conditions indicates that when the
available information suggested that a prolonged search
was the best strategy, high BIS individuals, due to their
higher level of NFC, gathered more information to reduce
uncertainty than low BIS individuals. However, the rule
available in the low anchor condition, which advised a
limited information search, diminished the indirect rela-
tionship between BIS and a prolonged decision making
strategy. We think that in this condition, reduction of
uncertainty to an acceptable level was achieved with a
shorter decision making process. A stronger manipulation
may be needed to significantly reverse this effect.
Although no difference was found between the control
group and the high anchor group, we think that there still
may be some psychological differences between those two
conditions. In the high anchor condition, the decision rule
was externally given to participants, while in the control
condition and in the Study 1 it was not available from the
Fig. 3 Decision time (Fixed Wins condition) as a function of NFC
and rule manipulation (Study 2)
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outside. Therefore, it is possible that the control condition
and high-anchor condition may differ with regard to other
aspects of the decision making process such as confidence
in the decision or satisfaction with a decision, even though
on a behavioral level the groups were similar. For example,
it could be expected that in the high anchor condition, the
uncertainty regarding the chosen strategy was lower than in
the control condition. It should be noted that the above-
mentioned effects were restricted to FW condition only.
We will discuss this limitation in the general discussion.
General discussion
We began this article with the observation that decision
making can be a demanding activity, but at the same time
not everyone experiences the process in the same way. In
two studies, we investigated the effects of individual dif-
ferences in BIS and NFC on the extent of information
gathering involved in a decision making process. In both
studies, BIS was strongly and positively related to NFC.
This result confirms the relationship between BIS and
NFC, which was found in one recent study (Corr et al.
2013).
Moreover, BIS was related to decision making behavior
through NFC. This indirect effect is in line with the in-
terpretation of BIS as a system that controls reactions to
new and ambiguous situations (Amodio et al. 2008;
Shackman et al. 2009). If uncertainty evokes more negative
reactions among high BIS individuals (Hirsh and Inzlicht
2008), then a high level of NFC offers a way out of such
situations, either by premature closure or by extensive
gathering of information, depending on the situational
context. It should be noted that neither direct nor the total
effect of BIS on decision making were significant. It could
be that we were not able to detect such effects of BIS even
though we were able to obtain a significant indirect effect,
because the statistical power is higher in the test of the
indirect effect than it is in the test of the total and direct
effect (Kenny and Judd 2014). As the observed effects
were moderated it would be interesting to investigate other
boundary conditions that would strengthen the relationship
between BIS, NFC, and decision making. One of such
variables could be framing the decisions in terms of gains
or losses. As high BIS individuals are more sensitive to-
wards negative stimuli they could be more motivated to
achieve certainty when the decision could result in loss
than when it could result in a gain.
Our interpretation of the relationship between BIS ac-
tivity and NFC focuses on the functionality of NFC,
which we assume is one of the mechanisms applied by
highly uncertain individuals to cope with a stressful en-
vironment. However, further research is needed to
determine whether behavior elicited by high NFC indeed
reduces feelings of uncertainty and anxiety. In addition,
although the causal direction assumed in the present study
seems convincing in terms of the biological underpinnings
of BIS, future research should verify the causal relation-
ship between uncertainty and NFC with an experimental
design. To fully understand the nature of the relationship
between BIS and decision making, further studies are
definitely needed.
With regard to the relationship between NFC and de-
cision making process, in both of our studies, when a de-
cision task did not offer a clear and confident cue, high
NFC participants sought more information and spent more
time making a decision than low NFC individuals. In
contrast, when a strategy was suggested, high NFC par-
ticipants behaved in line with the suggested strategy. This
result is important, because it confirms that NFC is not
always related to limited information processing; rather,
under certain circumstances, NFC may lead to a more
complex decision making style (e.g., Kruglanski et al.
1991; Vermeir et al. 2002). Although most of the previous
effects of NFC involved simplified cognitive processes
such as the anchoring effect (Kruglanski and Freund 1983),
increased overattribution bias (Webster 1993), mere ex-
posure effects (Kruglanski et al. 1996) or the effects of
priming (e.g., Ford and Kruglanski 1995), and reliance on
stereotypes (Dijksterhuis et al. 1996), these processes were
all observed in situations where prior knowledge was easily
accessible. We believe that such conditions are sufficient
for high NFC individuals to make a decision or form a
judgment based on a limited information search. However,
in situations where there is no clear rule to follow, high
NFC subjects prolong the information search supposedly to
reach a satisfactory level of certainty.
One important limitation to the generalizability of our
findings stems from the fact that we found differences
between the FW and DW rounds. The pattern of results for
the FW rounds was consistent across two studies but not for
the DW rounds, which may suggest that the effects of BIS
and NFC are different with regard to situations that involve
losses and ambiguity as it was the case in the DW round.
The lack of effect of NFC in this condition could be a result
of two competing tendencies—to reduce uncertainty and to
reduce costs—both of which may play a role for highly
uncertain individuals. In such a case we suspect that the
differences between conditions would be stronger if the
gains and losses were more meaningful to participants than
in our study. However, the lack of expected NFC effects
might also be due to the lower variance of dependent
variables in the DW conditions because on average, par-
ticipants in the DW conditions opened fewer boxes to de-
crease the costs of making a decision and spent less time on
the task.
550 Motiv Emot (2015) 39:541–552
123
The results of our study also contribute to existing
knowledge on the sources of NFC. The strong and positive
relationship between BIS and NFC may suggest that lim-
ited information processing observed under high NFC,
which on the surface seems to be simple and effortless,
may instead result from higher emotional costs experienced
by high BIS individuals in uncertain situations. Stress and
cognitive effort resulting from sensitivity to uncertainty
may be responsible for the typical effects of NFC on
judgment formation and decision making, which involves a
shorter and less extensive search. Simultaneous inclusion
of measures of cognitive resources and motivational factors
as predictors of NFC would help to clarify the origins of
NFC in future studies.
One of the limitations of our study is that there were
more female than male participants. Gender may be an
important factor determining the relationships explored in
our study as previous studies have demonstrated higher
scores of BIS among women than among men (e.g., Carver
and White 1994). The interesting question here is whether
men and women satisfy their search for certainty in similar
ways or whether they apply different decision making
strategies to decrease the feeling of uncertainty. Therefore,
it would be important to investigate this question in a more
gender-balanced group. Our studies have also certain
limitations resulting from the use of the Information
Sampling Task. One limitation stems from the fact that the
gains and costs experienced by participants were artificial
and without real consequences. It could be expected that if
the decisions made by participants brought real-life con-
sequences such conditions could elicit stronger effects than
the ones observed in laboratory conditions. On the other
hand, the most popular measures of social value orientation
are based on decomposed games, such as Triple Dom-
inance Measure (Van Lange et al. 1997), and they use
abstract point allocations. The research accumulated so far
confirms the validity and accuracy of such measures for
real-life allocation decisions. Finally, in our study par-
ticipants received information about the accuracy of their
decision, which could increase their confidence in a chosen
strategy. Without such feedback, we would expect typical
effects of anxiety and NFC to occur, such as escaping from
a stressful situation by giving the first plausible answer.
In summary, we believe that our research, despite its
limitations, offers the first attempt to integrate the basic
personality variable represented by BIS and a specific
epistemic motivation in a coherent model and to verify the
simultaneous effect of those factors on decision-making
style.
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